

R 281715Z JUL 04 COMSECONDFLT

TO ALSECONDFLT

INFO COMLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
FLTINFOWARCEN NORFOLK VA
COMSECONDFLT

ATTENTION INVITED TO

ROUTINE

R 281715Z JUL 04 PSN 323200I10

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BT
UNCLAS

THIS IS A 3 SECTION MESSAGE COLLATED BY DMDS

MSGID/GENADMIN/C2F//

SUBJ/OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC) GUIDANCE//

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REF/H/DOC/FIWC/01JUL2004//

NARR/REF A IS PREVIOUS VERSION OF COMSECONDFLT ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION (EEFI).

REF B IS COMBINED NORAD/USNORTHCOM INFORMATION OPERATIONS GUIDANCE.

REF C IS NAVADMIN 267/03 DIRECTING COMMANDS TO MAKE OPSEC A PRIORITY.

REF D IS COMLANTFLT OPSEC AWARENESS MSG.

REF E IS OPNAVINST 3432.1 NAVY WIDE POLICY FOR OPSEC.

REF F IS COMLANTFLT/COMPACFLT CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE ON SHIP AND SSN MOVEMENT.

REF G IS SECNAVINST 5720.47A, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY POLICY FOR CONTENT OF PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE WORLD WIDE WEB SITES.

REF H IS FIWC OPSEC ASSESSMENTS WEBSITE LOCATED AT
[HTTPS://WWW.FIWC.NAVY.MIL/OPSEC/ASSESSMENTS.SHTML//](https://www.fiwc.navy.mil/opsec/assessments.shtml)

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RMKS/1. INTRODUCTION.

A. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES OPSEC GUIDANCE TO SECONDFLT AND SUPERCEDES REF A. DENYING ADVERSARIES THE ABILITY TO PLAN AND CONDUCT ATTACKS AGAINST US ARMED FORCES AND THE NATION IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT UNIT COMMANDERS CONTINUALLY STRIVE TO IMPROVE THE OPSEC POSTURE OF THEIR COMMANDS. NAVAL FORCES ARE ON THE FRONT LINES IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM AND PROPER OPSEC IS THE FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE.

B. ISO REFS B - F, THE GOAL OF OPSEC IN THE COMSECONDFLT AOR IS TO CONTROL INFORMATION AND OBSERVABLE ACTIONS ABOUT FRIENDLY FORCE CAPABILITIES, LIMITATIONS, AND INTENTIONS TO PREVENT OR CONTROL THEIR EXPLOITATION BY AN ADVERSARY. SPECIFICALLY:

(1) IDENTIFY THOSE ACTIONS THAT CAN BE OBSERVED AND EXPLOITED BY ADVERSARY INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS.

(2) DETERMINE INDICATORS WHICH HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS MIGHT OBTAIN THAT COULD BE INTERPRETED OR PIECED TOGETHER TO DERIVE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN TIME TO BE USEFUL TO ADVERSARIES.

(3) SELECT AND EXECUTE MEASURES THAT ELIMINATE OR REDUCE THE VULNERABILITIES OF FRIENDLY ACTIONS TO ADVERSARY EXPLOITATION. ADDITIONALLY, OPEN SOURCE MATERIAL INCLUDING THE MEDIA, INTERNET, AND OBSERVATIONS OF US ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS ARE MAJOR SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR OUR ADVERSARIES. WHETHER THE ADVERSARY IS A NATION-STATE OR TERRORIST, COMMANDERS CAN REDUCE POTENTIAL VULNERABILITIES BY EMPLOYING BASIC OPSEC MEASURES.

2. GUIDANCE.

SECONDFLT UNITS SHALL USE THE FOLLOWING OPSEC COUNTERMEASURES TO OFFSET KNOWN COMMON VULNERABILITIES:

A. USE SECURE PHONE SYSTEMS TO DISCUSS SENSITIVE OR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. DO NOT TRY TO TALK AROUND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION ON UNSECURE LINES.

B. USE SECURE COMMUNICATIONS (E.G. JWICS, SIPRNET) FOR CORRESPONDENCE WHENEVER POSSIBLE.

C. RANDOMIZE THE PERFORMANCE OF FUNCTIONS AND OPERATIONAL MISSIONS. AVOID REPETITIVE OR STEREOTYPED TACTICS AND PROCEDURES FOR EXECUTING OPERATIONS OR ACTIVITIES IN TERMS OF TIME, PLACE, EVENT SEQUENCING FORMATIONS, AND C2 ARRANGEMENTS.

D. PROTECT BULLETIN BOARD, PLAN OF THE DAY, AND PLANNING SCHEDULE NOTICES THAT REVEAL WHEN EVENTS WILL OCCUR. THESE ITEMS SHOULD BE TREATED AS FOUO AND NOT REMOVED FROM THE WORKPLACE.

E. CONSIDER THE POTENTIAL THREAT OF TERRORISM WITHIN A GIVEN AREA WHEN CHOOSING TO WEAR MILITARY UNIFORMS, OR CIVILIAN CLOTHING WITH UNIT PATCHES AND SPECIAL INSIGNIA OFF BASE. FLIGHT JACKETS, CRUISE JACKETS, AND COMMAND BALL CAPS MAKE IT EASIER FOR TERRORISTS TO IDENTIFY MILITARY MEMBERS.

F. REVIEW UNCLASSIFIED COMMAND WEB SITES TO ENSURE SENSITIVE INFORMATION IS NOT DISPLAYED. WEB RISK ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST IS LOCATED AT REF H. SPECIFIC WEB SITE GUIDANCE IS INCLUDED IN REF G. HIGHLIGHTS INCLUDE:

(1) ENSURE ALL INFORMATION ON COMMAND WEB SITE IS ACCURATE AND IS APPROPRIATE FOR A WORLDWIDE AUDIENCE, FRIEND AND FOE ALIKE. RESTRICTING ACCESS TO .MIL DOMAIN ALONE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO PROTECT A WEBSITE.

(2) DESIGNATE, IN WRITING, A PRIMARY WEB SITE MANAGER AND INCLUDE INFORMATION ON HOW TO CONTACT THE WEB MANAGER ON THE COMMAND

HOME PAGE.

(3) REGISTER THE WEBSITE WITH THE FLEET INFORMATION WARFARE CENTER'S (FIWC) NAVY WEB SITE REGISTRATION SYSTEM (NWSRS). SEE REF G FOR WEBSITE ADDRESS.

(4) ENSURE IMAGES OF PERSONNEL DO NOT CONTAIN PERSONAL INFORMATION OTHER THAN NAME, RANK/RATE, AND DUTY STATION.

(5) ENSURE WEB SITES DO NOT IDENTIFY FAMILY MEMBERS OF DON PERSONNEL IN ANY WAY, INCLUDING IN PHOTOS OR PHOTO CAPTIONS, EXCEPT FOR SPOUSES OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP WHO ARE PARTICIPATING IN PUBLIC EVENTS. ALSO ENSURE FAMILY MEMBER INFORMATION IS NOT INCLUDED IN ANY BIOGRAPHIES.

(6) ENSURE WEB SITES DO NOT DISPLAY PERSONNEL LISTS, ROSTER BOARDS, ORG CHARTS, OR STAFF DIRECTORIES WHICH SHOW INDIVIDUALS' NAMES, PHONE NUMBERS, OR EMAIL ADDRESSES WHICH CONTAIN THE INDIVIDUAL'S NAMES. NAMES, TELEPHONE NUMBERS, AND EMAIL ADDRESSES OF COMMAND PUBLIC AFFAIRS PERSONNEL OR DESIGNATED COMMAND SPOKESPERSONS ARE ALLOWED.

(7) THE BIOGRAPHIES OF FLAG OFFICERS, COMMANDERS, CO'S, OIC'S, XO'S, DEPUTIES, AND CMC'S MAY BE POSTED TO COMMAND WEB SITES. HOWEVER, ENSURE BIOGRAPHIES DO NOT INCLUDE DATE OF BIRTH, RESIDENTIAL LOCATION, OR ANY INFORMATION REGARDING FAMILY MEMBERS.

3. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION (EEFI).
EEFI'S ARE SPECIFIC PIECES OF INFORMATION REGARDING FRIENDLY INTENTIONS, CAPABILITIES, AND ACTIVITIES THAT ARE LIKELY TO BE SOUGHT BY OUR FOES. EEFI OFTEN APPEAR INNOCUOUS, COMMONPLACE OR UNREMARKABLE BY THEMSELVES; HOWEVER, ADVERSARY INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL ARE ACCUSTOMED TO PRODUCING ADVANTAGES OUT OF A HOST OF SEEMINGLY INNOCENT OPSEC INDICATORS. WHEN ADVERSARIES HAVE ACCESS TO THESE INDICATORS, THEY ARE PRESENTED THE OPPORTUNITY TO DERIVE THE CRITICAL INFORMATION NECESSARY TO THWART OUR EFFORTS. MINIMUM

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SUBJ/OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC) GUIDANCE//
COMBINED FLEET EEFI'S ARE GIVEN IN REF D. COMSECONDFLT'S EEFI'S BUILD ON THE COMBINED FLEET EEFI'S AND ARE LISTED BELOW.
PROTECT THIS INFORMATION:

A. OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES.

- (1) DEPLOYMENT PLANS FOR U.S. FORCES.
- (2) MOVEMENT PLANS AND PROCEDURES FOR NAVAL UNITS WITHIN THEATER AND CONTIGUOUS SUPPORT AREAS.
- (3) DETAILS OF AIR COMBAT COMMAND PLANS/CAPABILITIES TO PROVIDE AIR STRIKE AND REFUELING SUPPORT.
- (4) MOVEMENTS OF ESSENTIAL MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL INDICATING EQUIPMENT LIMITATIONS.
- (5) EXTENT TO WHICH OPERATIONS UNDER A COA REDUCE U.S. CAPABILITIES FOR OPERATIONS IN OTHER THEATERS.
- (6) LOCATION, ACTIVATION, AND MISSIONS OF SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES.
- (7) OPERATIONAL READINESS INCLUDING CAT 3/4 CASREPS.
- (8) RESULTS OF FRIENDLY OR ADVERSARY OPERATIONS.

B. PLANS

(1) INFORMATION CONTAINED IN CONCEPT OPERATIONS PLANS (CONPLAN), OPERATIONS PLAN (OPLAN), OPERATIONS ORDER (OPORD), AND SUPPORTING PLANS AND ORDERS (E.G. BATTLE RHYTHM, COURSES OF ACTION) FOR OPERATIONS AND EXERCISES.

- (2) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) FOR U.S. FORCES OR CHANGES TO ROE.
- (3) ASSAULT OBJECTIVES.
- (4) MISSION PARTICIPANTS.
- (5) FLYING PROGRAMS.
- (6) MISSION SITUATION REPORTS.
- (7) FRIENDLY OR ADVERSARY OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTIC INTENTIONS.
- (8) UNDERWAY SCHEDULE, DATES OF DEPARTURE/ARRIVAL, PORT VISIT DATES.
- (9) SCHEDULE FOR STAFF EXERCISES AND EXPERIMENTS.
- (10) STAND-DOWN SCHEDULE.
- (11) EXERCISE SCENARIO GEOGRAPHY, GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION, ORDER OF BATTLE.
- (12) STATUS OF BILATERAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY COOPERATION ESSENTIAL TO OPERATIONS.
- C. DEPLOYMENT
 - (1) MISSION OR STATUS OF ASSIGNED OR TRANSITING AIR, SEA, AND GROUND SUPPORT ASSETS.
 - (2) FRIENDLY OR ADVERSARY POSITION, COURSE, SPEED, ALTITUDE, OR DESTINATION OF ANY AIR, SEA, OR GROUND ELEMENT, UNIT, OR FORCE.
- D. PROTOCOL.
 - (1) MOVEMENT OF VIPS, KEY LEADERS, AND KEY COMMAND PERSONNEL, INCLUDING VISITS TO THE THEATER.
 - (2) VIP ITINERARIES, MEETING AGENDAS, HOTEL RESERVATIONS, TRANSPORTATION PLANS/ROUTES, ETC, WITHIN THE THEATER.
- E. COMMUNICATIONS AND AUTOMATED INFORMATION SYSTEMS.
 - (1) USER ID'S AND PASSWORD COMBINATIONS.
 - (2) IP ADDRESSES IN ASSOCIATION WITH FUNCTION FOR ANY INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND COMMAND OR DOMAIN NAME.
 - (3) DETAILS OF SYSTEM OUTAGES/LIMITATIONS/CAPABILITIES/INTERCONNECTION/DEPENDENCIES AND NETWORK/SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES.
 - (4) EXISTENCE OF AND/OR DETAILS OF INTRUSIONS INTO NETWORKS/COMPUTER SYSTEMS INCLUDING SUCCESS/FAILURE, TECHNIQUES USED, AND VULNERABILITIES EXPLOITED.
 - (5) IDENTIFICATION OF INFRASTRUCTURES CRITICAL TO OPERATIONS.
- F. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (COMSEC)
 - (1) LINKAGE OF CODES OR CODE WORDS WITH PLAIN LANGUAGE.
 - (2) FRIENDLY OR ADVERSARY COMPROMISE OF CHANGING FREQUENCIES OR LINKAGE WITH THE LINE NUMBERS OR CIRCUIT DESIGNATORS.
 - (3) LINKAGE OF CHANGING CALL SIGNS OR UNITS.
 - (4) FACT OF COMPROMISE OF ENCRYPTED OR CLASSIFIED CALL SIGNS.
 - (5) FACT OF USE OF INCORRECT AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURES.
- G. LOGISTICS
 - (1) STATUS OF CRITICAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT, UNITS, MOVEMENT CAPABILITIES, AND STOCKPILES.
 - (2) PERSONNEL STRENGTHS, CURRENT, ASSIGNED, AND PROJECTED AUGMENTATION.
 - (3) QUANTITY OF FUEL OR AMMUNITION REMAINING. FRIENDLY OR ADVERSARY FORCE COMPOSITION, IDENTITY, LIMITATION, OR SIGNIFICANT CASUALTIES TO SPECIAL EQUIPMENT, PERSONNEL, SENSORS, UNITS, OR WEAPON SYSTEMS.
- H. ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) EMPLOYMENT
 - (1) INTENTION TO EMPLOY ELECTRONIC ATTACK (EA) AND ELECTRONIC SUPPORT (ES).
 - (2) OBJECTIVES OF EA OR ES, RESULTS OF FRIENDLY OR ADVERSARY EA OR ES, PRESENT OR INTENDED EMISSION CONTROL (EMCON) POLICY.
 - (3) EQUIPMENT AFFECTED BY EMCON POLICY.

I. FORCE PROTECTION (FP)

(1) STATUS OF FP PLANNING, IMPLEMENTING FP MEASURES, IDENTIFIED SECURITY SHORTFALLS, AND OVERALL FP POSTURE.

(2) SPECULATION OR DISCUSSION OF TERRORISTS EVENTS / ACTIVITIES / SUCCESSES / FAILURES OR OUR FORCE PROTECTION POSTURE AND TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES.

(3) PHYSICAL SECURITY WEAKNESS OF U.S. BASES THEATER-WIDE.

(4) ARCHITECTURAL INFO (BLDG/SHIP STRUCTURAL INFO).

(5) LOCATION OF POWER, PHONE, WATER, VENTILATION.

(6) EMERGENCY AND EVACUATIONS PLANS.

(7) SHIP'S FORCE PROTECTION METHODS AND CAPABILITIES.

(8) CONTINUITY OF OPS PLANS (COOP) .

(9) PERSONAL INFORMATION OF STAFF MEMBERS (FAMILY NAMES, HOME ADDRESSES, PHONE NUMBERS, ETC.).

(10) E-MAIL ADDRESS BOOKS THAT INCLUDE NAMES.

4. CRITICAL INFORMATION.

A. CRITICAL INFORMATION, A SUBSET OF EEFI, CONSISTS OF SPECIFIC FACTS NEEDED BY ADVERSARIES FOR THEIR PLANNING AND OPERATIONS TO GUARANTEE FAILURE (OR UNACCEPTABLE CONSEQUENCES FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT) OF SPECIFIC FRIENDLY OBJECTIVES. THEY INCLUDE SENSITIVE, CLASSIFIED, AND UNCLASSIFIED ASPECTS OF AN OPERATION THAT REQUIRE PROTECTION TO AVOID DISCLOSURE OF FRIENDLY CAPABILITIES, PLANS AND PROCEDURES. WHILE LIVING IN AN OPEN SOCIETY SOMETIMES PREVENTS US FROM PROTECTING ALL EEFI THAT THE ADVERSARY DESIRES, WE CAN PROTECT CRITICAL INFORMATION THAT IS VITAL TO THEM.

B. THE OPSEC PROCESS DESCRIBED IN REF E SHOULD BE USED DURING ALL OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR VITAL OPERATIONS TO DETERMINE CRITICAL INFORMATION FOR THAT OPERATION AND DETERMINE HOW TO PROTECT IT.

5. ACTION. IAW REF D, IWC'S SHALL FORWARD THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION TO C2F BY 1 SEP 04 USING RECORD MESSAGE OR EMAIL TO POC ABOVE:

A. STATUS OF COMPLETION OF OPSEC CHECKLIST AND WEB RISK

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SUBJ/OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC) GUIDANCE//
ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST. BOTH CAN BE FOUND AT FOUND AT
[HTTPS://WWW.FIWC.NAVY.MIL/OPSEC/ASSESSMENT.SHTML](https://www.fiwc.navy.mil/opsec/assessment.shtml).

B. NAME, RANK, AND DESIGNATION OF COMMAND OPSEC PROGRAM
MANAGER INCLUDING STU-III OR STE CAPABLE COMMERCIAL AND DSN
TELEPHONE NUMBERS AND NIPR/SIPR EMAIL ADDRESSES.

6. VISIT FLEET INFORMATION WARFARE ACTIVITY (FIWC) SIPRNET
WEBSITE (WWW.FIWC.NAVY.MIL/GUIDE) THEN CLICK ON "OPSEC FAQs"
FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE ON ESTABLISHING A PROPER OPSEC PROGRAM.//

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